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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
)i.MASA LYMAN CLARK, also known 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is a case in which the Estate filed a Petition seek-
ing to determine whether or not a contract was valid 
and should be recognized and carried out by the Estate. 
DISPOSITION MADE BY THE LOWER COURT 
'I'he Trial Court found that there was a valid con-
tract and directed specific performance. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to reverse the Trial Court and have 
the instrument declared a nonenforceable agreement. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. A. L. Clark, the decedent, had been a resident 
of Davis County for many years and an outstanding 
citizen of the community. He was one of the founders 
of the Davis County Bank and had during his lifetime 
owned considerable stock in the bank. This dispute in. 
volves an agreement made just prior to his death involv. 
ing 530 shares of said stock which was voted, controlled 
and owned by Mr. A. L. Clark to the time of his death. 
Mr. A. L. Clark died May 25, 1968, at the age of 1oi 
years and a resident of Davis County, State of Utah. 
Two months prior to his death he had signed an "Agree. 
ment for Sale of Stocks" (Exhibits "A" and "B"). It 
is the effect or construction of this agreement which 
the subject matter of this lawsuit. Mr. Bird, the attorney 
for Dale D. Clark, prepared this agreement (TR. 36). 
After the death of A. L. Clark and on February 28, 1969, 
the Executor of the Estate of Mr. A. L. Clark filed a 
"Petition for Confirmation of Sale of Personal Property" 
(R-1). By this Petition, the Estate sought to have the 
Court confirm the sale of 530 shares of Davis County 
Bank stock to Mr. Dale Clark for $31,800.00 (See R-1 
and 2) 
An objection to the confirmation of sale at the pricf 
indicated was filed by four of the heirs of A. L. Clark 
The heirs filing the Objection indicated to the Court that 
they would have no objection to a confirmation of sale 
if the Court would accept higher and better bids. ThiE 
was rejected by counsel for Dale D. Clark. An Amended 
Objection was subsequently filed by the same Objecteri 
and an Answer to the Objection was filed by Dale D. 
Clark. 
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The agreement, in its entirety, reads as follows: 
"AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCKS 
"In consideration of the settlement of a law-
suit between Dale D. Clark and Howard S. Clark 
and of the promises herein contained and of the 
payment of $100.00 by Dale D. Clark to A. L. 
Clark, receipt of which by A. L. Clark is hereby 
acknowledged the following agreement is made 
by the parties : 
''l. A. L. Clark is the owner of 530 shares of the 
capital stock of the Davis County Bank which 
he agrees is sold to Dale D. Clark for the 
sum of $60.00 per share, a total price of 
$31,800.00. 
··2. Dale D. Clark agrees to pay the said sum of 
$31,800.00 for said stock upon demand. 
''3. The stock shall continue to be vQted, con-__ 
trolled and owned by A. L. Clark so long as 
he lives or uitfi he shall be paid in full for 
said stock following demand for payment and 
tender of stock by A. L. Clark. 
''4. If there shall be any disagreement as to the 
interpretation of this agreement, it shall be 
resolved by arbitration, each party to name 
one arbitrator and they two to select a third 
arbitrator, the decision of a majority to be 
binding upon the parties. 
"Dated March 22, 1968, at Farmington, Utah. 
Witness /s/ A. L. Clark 
A. L. Clark 
/s/ Bonnie S. Evans 
/s/ Dale D. Clark 
Dale D. Clark" 
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At the time of the filing of the Amended 
the Objecters sought to have it determined whether 01 
not this was a proceeding for the "confirmation of the 
sale of personal property" under Section 75-10-8, UCA 
1953, or if this was a proceeding for the enforcement of 
a contract under Section 75-11-26, UCA 1953. Upon the 
hearing of the Petition to file the Amended Objection 
before the Honorable Thornley K. Swan on April 22, 
1969, the Court ruled as follows: 
"THE COURT: Well, I believe, Mr. Conder, 
while the petition is entitled 'Petition for Confir. 
mation of Sale of Personal Property,' it clearly 
sets forth the agreement upon which the purchaser, 
Dale D. Clark, relies, attaches a copy of the agree-
ment dated March 22nd, 1968. This Court has 
understood that the whole proceeding is for au-
thority to perform the agreement entered into by 
the deceased. 
"Isn't that your understanding¥ 
"MR. CONDER: That's what I assumed 
they'd want to do. I want to make sure of the 
position, because I think the statute makes a dif· 
f erence between the two. 
"THE COURT: Isn't that your understand· 
ing, Mr. Bird? 
"MR. BIRD: Yes. Yes." (R-18, TR 4 and 
5) 
The trial was set for May 9, 1969, and the matter 
heard before the Honorable Charles G. Cowley. Exhibits 
"A" and "B," being copies of the agreement, were intro; 
duced into evidence and received by the Court. (TR. 1 
and 5) The difference between Exhibits "A" and "B'' 
consists simply of some additional writing on oni- copY 
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not contained on the other but both are executed copies 
of the same agreement, one being held by the Estate of 
A. L. Clark and the other one being held by Dale D. Clark. 
At the trial and since the proceeding was one to en-
force the "contract," the attorney representing the Oh-
jecters asserted that no claim had been filed pursuant 
to Sections 75-9-1 and 75-9-2 of the Utah Code Annotated 
1953, and therefore the Court would have to dismiss the 
proceeding. There was no claim upon which the Court 
could act. (TR. 9 and 10) The attorney representing the 
c:;tatt'd to thP Con rt: 
· .\iR P1\L:\lt.:R: '.\'pare intert'stt>d in k:now-
rng what WP shrntld do as UJ1 PSt<iJP for par-
'"·111<> r µTnnp of ,.:to('k. 
"
11' u l' :. 'f) rRT: -,- i)" 'r , I '. \w:-;p peo1)lf' 
)i: · 
",\i L-t F1 / :.,,\[ i(ii · ,.;,. i'"' ,-c11Tt>et. And this 
onr position. 
·• fn other woTds. we Jiave some stock on hand. 
i'hpre's a document that it's heen sold. \Ve 
want to know what to do with iC' (TR. 7) 
After sonw discussion between Court and counsel, 
it was concluded that since Mr. Dale D. Clark was the 
one who was speeifically interested in the enforcement 
of the "contract" he should go forward with his proof 
m the case. Mr. Bird then put in the exhibit, a copy 
of the agreement, and rested. (TR 26). At that time, 
the Court then stated: 
"THE COURT: (interposing) Well, the 
agreement was to be perfonned in the future when 
it was signed 1 
"MR. BIRD : Yes. The delivery of the stock. 
5 
The of thf' 
was to be m the future, and delivery of the monPi 
for the stock was to be in the future? · 
"MR. BIRD: Yes. 
"THE COURT: 
"MR. BIRD: Yes, sir." (TR. 27) 
Mr. Bird, as counsel for Dale D. Clark, then deter. 
mined that perhaps he should put on some evidence re. 
garding the demand to be made pursuant to thP term, 
of the instrument. Mr. Dale D. Clark testified that 
during the lifetime of his father there was newr any 11' 
mand made upon him for performance of the agreel!Mt 
(TR. 29), and that after the death of his father there ila< 
been no demand upon upon him for the perforrnancP of 
the (TR. 29). 
The agreement, shown on the face of Exhibits "A'' 
and "B," was prepared by Mr. Bird as the attorney for 
Dale D. Clark. ('TR. 36) 
POINTS RAISED ON APPEAL 
1. UTAH'S NON-CLAIM STATUTE BARS ANY OB-
LIGATION OF THE EXECUTOR TO DALE D. 
CLARK ARISING UNDER THE "AGREEMENT FOR 
SALE OF STOCKS." 
2. THE COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO 
DIRECT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE 
AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCK. 
3. THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT FOR THE SALE 
OF STOCK IS ILLUSORY AND LACKING IN OBLI-
GATION ON THE PART OF A. L. CLARK OR IS AT 
MOST AN OPTION TO SELL STOCK AT A CERTAIN 
SUM WHICH CEASED TO BE EFFECTIVE WITH 
6 
THE DEATH OF THE OPTIONEE, A. L. CLARK. 
4. THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCK FAILS 
AS A GIFT CAUSA MORTIS. 
5. THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCK FAILS 
AS A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH'S NON-CLAIM STATUTE BARS ANY OB-
LIGATION OF THE EXECUTOR TO DALE D. 
CLARK ARISING UNDER THE "AGREEMENT FOR 
SALE OF STOCKS." 
The Executor of the Estate of Amasa Lyman Clark 
filed a "Petition for Confirmation of Sale of Personal 
Property" on February 25, 1969. The attorney for the 
Estate said that he had filed the Petition to determine 
whether or not there was a valid agreement and to get 
instructions from the Court as to what to do. (TR. 12 
and 18) 
Neither Dale D. Clark nor anyone on his behalf filed 
any claim with the Estate within the time prescribed by 
onr statute. The Utah statute is very clear on the point. 
75-9-4, UCA 1953, provides as follows: 
"All claims arising upon contract, whether the 
same are due, not due or contingent, must be pre-
sented within the time limited in the notice, and 
any claim not presented is barred forever; ... " 
(Emphasis added) 
Dale D. Clark's position is based upon an alleged 
contract This is the very foundation of his action. His 
whole position is that he has a contract which he seeks 
to have enforced. Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2d Ed., 
Vol 3, Sec. 768, p. 503, states: 
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'' ... The clear efft=>ct of such a 
shown in succeeding sections, is to mah 
ment or filing in probate of every 'claim' which 
falls within the contl:•mpla tion of th1• 
above referred to an absolute condition pn'cedent 
to maintaining an action thereon against the ex. 
ecutor or administrator, barring forever all 
not so presented within the period of the local 
statute of non-claim. Frequently even the revivor 
of actions pending against the decedent at the 
time of his death is precluded by express statute 
unless claim on the cause of action is first pre-
sented or filed as any otht>r demand." 
The language in the statute admits of no 
All claims arising on contract must be presened, and thi1 
is so whether they are due or whether they are not dtw 
or whether they are only contingent. The Utah cases han 
so held. In re Anje1l·ierdens Estate, 13 Utah 2d 378, 374 
P. 2d 845 (1962); Halloran-Jildge Trust Co. v. Heath, 70 
Utah 124, 258 Pac. 342 (1927); In re Agees Estate, 
Utah 130, 252 Pac. 891 (1927); and In re Neff's Estate, 
8 Utah 2d 368, 335 P.2d 403 (1959). 
In In re Anjewierdens Estate, the claim was actually 
received by the Executor or Probate Court several days 
after the expiration of the time for filing claims and 
the delay had resulted solely from failure of the claim-
ant's attorney to mail the claim to the proper address. 
The delay was nevertheless held fatal to the claim. In 
In re Agees Estate, the Court held the provisions of the 
statutes requiring timely presentation of contract claims 
and prompt suit after presentation were jurisdictional 
in nature and that the Probate Court was without powei 
to allow claims not made in compliance therewith. In In 
8 
re Neff's Estate, the Plaintiff had filed a suit before 
the death of the decedent. Even though the action was 
pending at the death of the decedent so that the deced-
ent's Administrator and other parties interested would 
have had. notice of it, the Court nevertheless held the 
statutes requiring presentation and claims to the Estate 
had to be complied with and that failure to so comply 
barred enforcement of the Judgment against the Estate, 
even th(i)ugh the Administrator had appeared in the action 
and defended it. The head note in this case clearly re-
flects the decision where it says: 
"Where creditor filed unverified complaint 
against father and son, partners, complaint was 
pending at father's death and administrator of 
father's estate was substituted as a party defend-
ant, that no claim was filed within time given 
creditors to file, judgment rendered against ad-
ministrator of father's estate was not enforceable 
against the father's estate." 
It is clear that the statute is mandatory even when 
a contract is still executory following the death of the 
decedent. In Halloran-Jud_qc Trust Co. v. Heath, supra, 
the decedent's Executors had taken over management of 
a building after the death of the decedent in violation of a 
contract decedent had made with Plaintiff, under which 
Plaintiff was to manage the building. The Plaintiff failed 
to present a claim to the Estate's Executors prior to the 
commencement of suit and the Court denied Plaintiff 
since his claim was a contingent claim within the 
terms of the Non-claim Statute and was barred, not hav-
ing been properly presented. To the same effect are 
Lieuer v. Sherman, 130 Colo. 216, 274 P.2d 816; James v. 
19 
Corvin, 184 Wash. 356, 51 P.2d 689; and Lwndy v. Lemp, 
32 Idaho 162, 179 Pac. 738. The cases are collected in 
annotations appearing in 41 ALR 144 and 4 7 ALR 896. 
In Lundy v. Lemp, the purchaser of real estate under 
a contract with a decedent failed to present a claim to 
decedent's Executor. The purchaser had not fully paid 
the purchase price when the seller died. The Court held 
the purchaser's suit barred by the Non-claim Statute 
and also by the purchaser's failure to present his claim 
to the Executor prior to commencing suit. 
Counsel for Dale D. Clark argues that the Executor 
was aware of this claim. We submit, however, that the 
mere knowledge of the Executor that someone is orally 
asserting a claim is insufficient. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Clayton v. 
Dinwoodey, 33 Utah 251, 93 Pac. 723, 14 Ann. Cas. 9261 
had before it the question of whether or not a claim 
for taxes due the Estate had to be presented to the Court 
pursuant to the statute cited. The Utah Supreme Court 
said: 
"Had the claim here been barred by the gen-
eral statute of limitations, or by the special statute, 
such as where a claim had been presented and re-
jected by the executors and suit was not com-
menced within the time provided by the statute, 
or where 1w claim had been presented nor swt 
commenced within the time in which a claim would 
have been properly presented, the bar of the stat-
ute would be a complete defense . ... (Emphwis 
added) 
In the Dinwoodey case, the Supreme Court held that 
the filing of a verified Complaint within the time pre· 
10 
scribed constituted a suffieient claim. In the subsequent 
c.ase of In re: Jones Estate, (1940), 99 Utah 373, 104 P. 
2d 210, at p. 212, the Supreme Court again cited the 
Dinwoodey case and said: 
"In Clayton v. Dinwoodey, 33 Utah 251, 93 
P. 723, 14 Ann. Cas. 926, we used this language: 
'Mere knowledge on the part of the1 executor or 
administrator of the existence of a debt • • • is 
not sufficient to dispense with the necessity of 
presentation. • • • the defense that the claim is 
barred by the statute of limitations cannot be 
waived by the executor or administrator." 
At the trial, Dale D. Clark's counsel argued that the 
nonfilling of the claim was not timely raised. We submit, 
however, that this is something that cannot be waived 
and thus goes to the very heart of this issue of whether 
or not there is any "agreement" that can be specifically 
enforced by the Court. 
In the Clayton v. Dinwoodey case, this Court said: 
" ... This principle, however, must not be 
confused with that involved, where the claim is 
barred by the general statue of limitations, and 
because of the bar cannot be allowed by the execu-
tor or administrator or the judge, as provided in 
section 3857, or where the claim was neither pre-
sented nor suit commenced within the time in 
which the claim could properly have been pre-
sented. For the defense that the claim is barred by 
the statute of limitations cannot be waived by the 
executor or administrator. Fullerton v. Bailey, 
17 Utah, 85, 53 Pac. 1020; Reay v. Heazelton, 128 
Cal. 335, 60 Pac. 977." 
This Court has previously held on several occasions 
that the of limitations cannot be waived by the 
11 
Executor even though it is not pleaded as a defense. Th, 
case of Gulbranson v. Thompson, 118 Utah 452, 222 Pac 
590, held: 
"It is next contended that plaintiff's claim If 
barred by our general statute of limitations except 
as to those services that were rendered within (hp 
four years immediately preceding the death ol 
plaintiff's mother, our statute barring actiom 
upon express or implied oral agreements or ac 
counts, where an action is not brought within four 
years after the conclusion of the services or th1 
last item of an account. Plaintiff's counsel, how 
ever, insists that this defense is not available to 
the defendant, for the reason that the statute or 
limitations ·was not pleaded in the answer. If 
were an action between two living adversariei. 
then, according to the de-cisions of this court coun 
sel's contention would be sound. In view, how 
u\·er, that the action is against the administrator 
of a deceased person's estate for a claim arising 
during the lifetime of the deceased, the genera! 
rule that the statute must be pleaded in order to 
be available does not apply. This court has at 
least in two cases expressly held that an adrnini1 
trator cannot waive the defense of the statute ol 
limitations under our statute, and hence his fa//. 
ure to plead the same cannot avail the claimanl 
Fullerton "'7. Bailey, 17 Utah 85, 53 Pac.1020; ClaY 
ton v. Dinwoodey, 33 Utah 251, 93 Pac. 723, .ll 
Ann. Cas. 926. Such is also the rule in Califorma 
Reay v. Heazelton, 128 Cal. 335, 60 Pac. 977, anil 
cases there cited." (Emphasis added) 
It follows that inasmuch as Dale D. Clark failed tu 
present a claim of any nature whatever to the 
within the time limited by tht>. Notice to Creditors 1• 
now barred from obtaining any relief under the M:rrr 
uwnt for Sale of Stocks executed by the decedent. 
12 
POINT II 
THE COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO 
DIRECT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF THE 
AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCK. 
.: Proper 11ierulinus are 11, Jnrisdictionul prerequi-
sdi 11· f/11' den rl/l/i/l/[ion I)((/ clui111 for specific perform-
11}/(I 11/11ler Setfio11 7:)-11-26 thrrmgh 75-11-.'Jl, UCA 
:-;edion 7!"i-11-'l.7, UCA 1953, proYides: 
·, 111 the ures1'1ir1itio11 of a. 1·erifiPd pet0 tion 
/;11 111111 1;•'rso11 clarim111g f.u lie entitled fo such con-
1'<'.1/0rtCI', a:-::-:if-,rr1ment, transfer or deliverv from 
an executor or admmistrator, setting forth the 
facts upon which the elaim is predicated, the 
Conrt or Clerk mnst appoint a time and place 
for hearing· the petition, which shall be npon no-
tice." (Emphasis added) 
Section 75-11-28 refers to a full hearing "upon the 
petition and objections" and Section 75-11-29, lICA 1953, 
refers to "the petitioner." In Rogers v. Nichols, 75 Utah 
290, 284 Pac. 992 ( 1930), no proper petition to the Pro-
hate Court for a Decree of Specific Performance had been 
made by a claimant who asserted his entitlement to a 
conveyance of real property. The Probate Court had 
nevertheless decreed specific performance, assuming the 
issne was before it on certain Affidavits and other papers. 
The Utah Supreme Court held the Probate Court entirely 
without proper jurisdiction to direct specific performance 
of a contract to sell real property where no proper 
pleadingt-; had been prt>sented in the Probate Court and, 
in particular, where no Petition had been filed by the 
13 
buyer for such relief. Similarly, in Free v. Little, 31 Utan 
449; 88 Pac. 407 ( 1907), the Supreme Court held the fail 
ure to file the Verified Petition as required by 
within the time limits proved fatal to the right of SJ)€c)fie 
performance, even though under the terms of the contracl 
the time for buyer's performance had not expired when 
the seller's Estate was probated. 
Dale D. Clark has never filed a Verified Petition here 
in and has made no Petition nor filed any pleading in tht 
Probate Court requesting a Decree of Specific Perform. 
ance. The only Petition filed is that of the ann 
that Petition is wholly out of order and is not in pro]lfr 
form. 
No proper pleadings having been presented to th1 
Probate Court, the Probate Court is without jurisdiction 
to further proceed. 
B. Dececised was not bound by contract to convey 
or tratnSfer anythimg to Dale D. Clark as required oy 
Section 75-11-26, UCA 1953. 
Section 75-11-26, UCA 1953, provides: 
"When a person who is bound by contract in 
writing to convey any real estate or who is boiw4 
by contract in writing to assign, transfer or 
liver any personal property, shares of capita! 
stock, bonds or other choses in action, dies befon 
making the conveyance, assignment, transfer or 
delivery; and in a.ll cases whe·n sitch decedent 
if living, might be compelled to make such co·n· 
veyance, assignment, transfer or delivery, tht 
court may make a decree authorizing his t>xecntor 
or administrator to convey such real estate, or 11' 
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assign, transfer or dl:'liver such personal property, 
of capital stock, bonds or other choses in 
action, to the person m titled thereto." (Emphasis 
added) 
The subj<:>et "Agreement for Sale of Stocks" does not 
h.i· tt>nns hind .\. L. Clark or his ExPcutor to do any-
rhiug. ThP does not contain a single word 
,11Jlit,'1ng A. L. Clark to transfl·r the stock. At most, it 
him tht' right, hut not the obligation, to make de-
i!land for paYnwrn dnd tend\•r the stock to Dale D. Clark, 
,1 which P\ ent Dalt· D. Clark was hound to pay A. L. 
1 'Jurk $b0.00 ! .,.1 ..;l1an'. t«.uld tlw havP been 
1·1,l!;pelled t(J .i1akl· <rn a:-:s1gnrm•nt. transfer or deltvery1 
\1, 1 Paragraph ::l ot the agrl:'ern1·nt in-ovides 
':hat "the ,.:to<'k ,.:hall <·ontinnt> to he vott•d, controllPd and 
fnrned h>· A. L. Clark for as long as hP live!" or until he 
he vaid in full for said stock f o1loicing demand for 
paynwnt l1y A. L. Clark." (Emphasis added) Under this 
provision of the agreement, A. L. Clark clearly intended 
to retain entire control over the matter of his perform-
ance. He could not have been compelled to do anything. 
Further, the agreement nowhere: provides that A. L. Clark 
or his Executor shall transfer and deliver the stock upon 
or after his death. Nowhere does it give either his Execu-
tor or Dale Clark the right to demand payment and ten-
der the stock or require the same. The agreement is solely 
conditioned upon demand for payment and tender of 
stock by A. L. Clark himself. The agreemoot totally and 
completely fails to meet the standards required by Sec-
tion 75-11-26, UCA 1953, for specific performance, and 
hPnce such could not not be decreed by the Court even if 
pro1wr plf'adings had been filed so as to enable the Court 
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to exercise appropriate jurisdiction in the matter. In Wii 
son v. Fackrell, 54 Idaho 515, 34 P.2d 409, the Court 
held that "in order for appellant to be entitled to reliti 
sought the proof must show the decedent was found, h 
contract in writing, to convey ... and that it was sur·ii 
a contract that he, if living might be compelled to rnak' 
the conveyance." 54 P. 2d at 411. See also In re Leui., 
Estate, 2 Wash. 2d 458, 98 P. 2d 654. 
C. The Court is without jurisdiction to decree spr 
cific performance where the right of the Petitioner is/, 
doubt. 
hrf a hearing· at-' 
th'" :rf fiHJ tn baYP "'":r:ie1_:·ic· ;i1, 1' 
or' thv (Ontntn i;.. '" ip do11htt11 
tJ11c> eourt ;1111::-;t (ti::OllllS1' thP ]ktiticii 
Rrrncroft Probate Practice. Section 532. point; llli! 
that t'\tatutes similar to those of Utah, whieh aJlo,r :. 
Probate Court to decree specific preformance of a con 
tract regarding personality, are unusual and a "distimt 
innovation." Since it is settled law that such contract' 
are not specifically enforceable in equity absent ven 
unusual circumstances, Bancroft further points out that 
the provisions allowing specific enforcement by the Pro 
bate Court appear to be practically useless, particular!: 
since it is also provided that where a Petitioner's righi 
to specific performance is found to be doubtful hy th' 
Probate Court it must dismiss the proceeding. HerP, not 
only do we have no proper Petition but rights and douhi 
alone compels dismissal of even a proper proceeding. 
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POINT 111 
THE ALLEGED AGREEMENT FOR THE SALE 
OF STOCK IS ILLUSORY AND LACKING IN OB-
LIGATION ON THE PART OF A. L. CLARK OR 
IS AT MOST AN OPTION TO SELL STOCK AT 
.\ CERAIN SUM WHICH CEASED TO BE EFFEC-
'I'IVE WITH THE DEATH OF THE OPTIONEE, A. 
L. CLARK. 
A. The subject agreement is illusory and lacking 
n obligation. 
Mr. Dale D. Clark testified as follows: 
"Q. Mr. Clark, I asked you if you could rec-
ognize the handwriting that appeared on the back 
of Exhibit 'B,' and as I recall you said you could 
not recall that handwriting. 
"Do you recall who prepared Exhibit 'A' and 
the front part of Exhibit 'B,' dictated it or drafted 
it1 
"A. Yes. This was drafted. This is one of 
the drafts prepared by my attorney. 
"Q. Is that Mr. Bird T 
"A. Yes." (TR. 36) 
It is elementary that in the interpretation of the con-
tract it is construed against the drafter - in this case, 
Dale D. Clark. 4Williston on Contracts (3rd Ed.) Sec. 
621. Therefore, any ambiguities in the subject agreement 
will be interpreted in favor of the heirs and Executor. 
When a promissor retains an option concerning the ex-
tent of his performance or promises to do a thing only 
when it pleases him, he is not bound - the agreement is 
only illusory, no enforceable legal promise having been 
made. Tatsch v. Hamilton-Erickson Mfg. Co., 76 N.M. 
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729, 418 2d 187 (1966); R. J. Daum Construction Co.' 
Child; 22 Utah 194, 24 7 P .2d 817 ( 1952) ; Lawrence Blot! 
Co., Inc. v. Palston, 123 CA 2d 300, 266 P.2d 856; Mitch/! 
Novelty Co. v. United Mfg., 94 F. Supp. 612 (Ill. 195Ui 
The subject agreement is illusory as regards the perfonu 
ance of A. L. Clark because it nowhere provides thatA.L 
Clark is compelled to do anything. Under it, he has tie 
right to determine when and if he should ·sell his st-OcK 
He had no obligatl.on to do anything unless he felt 811 
inclined. It follows that the agreement must fail becam1 
it is illusory. 
B. The subject agreement at most is an option/, 
sell stock. 
If the subject agreement is not completely illmor.1 
lacking in obligation; ineffectual, it is at most by its term· 
an option to sell stock at such time as A. L. Clark shoul1: 
elect, upon the exercise of which Dale D. Clark 
have become obligated to pay $31,800.00. The agreewen· 
is necessarily a unilateral contract which bound the 011 
tionee (A. L. Clark) to do nothing but granted him tn· 
right to sell his stock before his death in the manner W 
cified in the option. 1 WiUiston On Contracts (3rd Ed.: 
Sec. 618. The agreement, by its terms, is exactly this ani: 
no more. Particularly is this so when it is construed moi' 
strongly against Dale D. Clark. By its terms, Dale D 
Clark did not become absolutely obligated to deliwi 
cash but became obligated to do so only upon demandfo1 
payment and tender of stock by A. L. Clark. The agreP 
ment, by its terms, gives A. L. Clark all of the rights in 
volved and placed upon Dale D. Clark all of the dutieo 
which duties were callable at the option and at tht>lim 
18 
that A. L. Clark should elect. 
The Trial Court in its Findings of Fact finds that 
Dale D. Clark wrus not the owner of the stock when it 
found as follows : 
"3. Following the appointment of Zions First 
National Bank as executor of the estate, Dale D. 
Clark, contacted the executor and advised it that he 
wanted to buy the stock and was prepared to go 
forward with his agreement, and that he was able 
to perform." 
There can be no specific performance of an unaccepted 
c l'twn. 
"There can be no specific perfonnance of an 
unaccepted option. An option holder cannot en-
force it until he elects and binds himself to perform 
it, thereby transfonning it into a mutual contract 
to sell and to buy, whereas before such election it 
was unilateral. It is the contract consummated 
by the acceptance of the option which the courts 
enforce." 49 Am. Jnr. Specific Performance, p.140. 
See also Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol. 12A, 
Secs. 5634 and 5635, to the same effect. 
C. The option to se.U expired with tke death of A. L. 
Clark. 
It is clear that no demand has ever be.en made by 
A. L. Clark during his lifetime nor his Estate since his 
death. Nowhere in the agreement is it provided that the 
right to exercise the option should survive to the Execu-
tor of the Estate of A. L. Clark. Rather, it is specifically 
provided that the demand for payment and tender of 
stock should be made "by A. L. Clark." A. L. Clark not 
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having made demand nor tendered the stock prior fo lii 
death, the option or the off er was terminated. Sul'ii 
is the general rule. As Williston points out, 
"Assuming that the formation of a contra
1
., 
required mutual mental assent of the parties ann 
off er and acceptance were merly evidence of surr 
assent, it would be obviously impossible that i 
contract should be formed where either party :11 
the transaction died before this assent Wa.5 on 
tained. That such assent was formerly though! 
necessary seems probable, and as to death, th1, 
theory is still maintained. Accordingly, it is gen 
erally held that the death of the offeror tenninatl'i 
the offer. Since an off er can be accepted only IF 
the person to whom it is made, the death of the 
off eree also has the effect of precluding the ]JOssi 
bility of the contract as does the destruction 01 
the subject matter." 1 Williston on Contracts, (3111 
Ed.), Sec. 62. 
A. L. Clark having died prior to the time of his ai 
sent to a firm contraet was obtained, no contract ever 
arose and the option terminated. 
D. If the option did inure to the benefit of the Er 
ecutor, it wowd be improper for the Executor to exerc1" 
it. 
Assuming the Executor does have the right to exer 
cise the option, which it plainly does not, no tender ami 
demand having been made by it, there is no predicate upon 
which specific performance may be deceed. Rude 18 
Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 96 Pac. 560. A further problem j, 
presented by the fact that the option is not particnlarli 
valuable to the Estate and in point of fact has a negatw 
value. As pointed out in In re Fullmer's Estate, 203 Ca! 
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693, 265 Pac. 920, an option can be an asset of the Estate 
which should be preserved, but only if it is actually valu-
able. The option is not valuable and the Executor would 
therefore be liable to the Estate for the loss occasioned 
to the Estate by its exercise. Bancroft, Probate Practice, 
SPe. 529. The clear duty of the Executor is to sell personal 
property only if such is in the best interest of the Estate 
and those interested. Sections 75-10-1 and 75-10-8, UCA 
1953. It is the obligation of the Executor to obtain maxi-
mum value for that sold. Sections 75-10-7 and 75-10-15, 
H'A 1953. 
POINT IV 
THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCK 
FAILS AS A GIFT CAUSA MORTIS. 
It may be argued that the agreement shows an in-
tent on the part of A. L. Clark that Dale D. Clark should 
have 530 shares of the capital stock of the Davis County 
Bank upon the death of A. L. Clark and that the dif-
ference between the value of said stock and the sum 
Dale D. Clark agreed to purchase was the subject of 
a gift. Any such contention must fail because the law is 
clear that there can be no valid donation causa mortis 
without actual manual delivery to the donee personally, 
or to some third person as his agent, of the subject of the 
gift-in this case, 530 shares of the capital stock of 
the Davis County Bank. The failure of the decedent to 
part absolutely with the shares of stock in his lifetime 
is fatal. As stated by the Court in Basket vs. Hassell, 
107 U.S. 602, 27 L. Ed. 500: 
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''A delivery in terms \Yhich confer:- upon tlir 
donee power to control the fund after the. death 
of the donor and by the instrument itself, it i. 
presently payable, is h'stamPntary in d1aradPJ 
and not good as a gift." 
The subject agreement does not operate inter vivoi. 
In fact, it does not indicate any intent to operate after 
the death of A. L. Clark. If such an intention be im. 
plied, still any such attempted disposition fails for fail 
ure of the decedent to relinquish control prior to 
death. Allen vs. Hendrick, 104 Ore. 202, 206 Pac. 73:J: 
Hillman vs. YoU!ng, 64 Orn. n, 127 Pac. 793; Nobel io 
Garden, 46 Cal. 225, 79 Pac. 83 ( 1905) ; and Norton u. 
r 
I 
Norton's Estate, 41CA614, 183 Pac. 214. I 
I 
POINT V 
THE AGREEMENT FOR SALE OF STOCK 
FAILS AS A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION. 
The Statute of Wills provides that a testamentary 
disposition must be subscribed at the end thereof in the 
presence of two attesting witnesses; that the Testator 
must declare to the attesting witnesses that the instru· 
ment is his Will and that the two attesting witnesses · 
must sign their names as witnesses at the end of the i 
Will, each, at the Testator's request, in his presence and 1 
in the presence of the other. Section 74-1-5, UCA 1953. 
The subject instrument does not comply with these stan· 
<lards. Further, it is elementary that a Will must show 
the intention of the Testator to leave certain property 
or it will fail. The subject instrument does not sho1r 
by its terms that the Testator, A. L. Clark, intended to 
bequeath anything to Dale D. Clark. 
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CONCLUSION 
1'he statutes and other authorities cited above make 
it ,.J!:'ar that any obligation of the Executor to Dale D. 
Clark is barred hy the Non-claim Statute; that the Court 
J.' 11·itl10nt jurisdiction to direct s1wcific perfonnance 
mH'l, proper pl Pa dings ha n not been filed; that specific 
pµrfnrmancP cannot be decreed inasmuch as the subject 
ag-rµPnwnt does not ohligate A. L. Clark or his Estate 
,0 transf Pr :-:han';-; to DalP D. Clark and A. L. Clark 
,,i\i1l nc1t ;iavP lW\'11 r:ornvelled to make such a transfer 
:'! Iii" lifttinw as required hy statute; that in ease of 
r1onht a:-; to thP availability of specific performance the 
ProhatP Conrt 11rnst dismiss t}JP ]ll"OCPedings; that the 
agrePment is illusory in nahue and not enforce-
ahlP as a contrad; that at most the subject agreement 
was an option to sell stock, exercisable only by A. L. 
Clark, which bPcame void and unenforceable at his death; 
that Pren if the option had not expired at the death of 
A. L. Clark, it would be inappropriate and wrongful for 
th<' to attempt to exercise it under the circum-
stances; and that the instruml:'nt totally fails as a gift 
causa mortis or as an attempted testamentary disposition. 
The Trial Court should be reversed and the Peti-
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